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ABSTRACT 
 
The relative success of Australian and Canadian banks in weathering the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) has been noted by a number of commentators. Their earnings, capital levels 
and credit ratings have all been a source of envy for regulators of banks in Europe, 
America and the United Kingdom. The G-20 and the European Union have tried to identify 
the features of the Canadian and Australian financial systems which have underpinned this 
success in order to use them in shaping a revised international regulatory framework. 
Despite this perceived success, the impaired assets (also known as non-performing loans) 
of banks in both countries increased several fold over the GFC, and we investigate the 
determinants of this, using impaired assets as our measure of bank risk. Previous studies in 
other countries have tended to focus on the impact of bank specific factors, such as size 
and return on equity, in explaining bank risk. Our approach involves including those 
traditional variables, plus Distance to Default (DD), and a novel contagion variable, which 
is the effect of major global bank DD on Australian and Canadian banks. Using panel data 
regression over the period 1999-2008, we find that various balance sheet and income 
statement factors are not good explanatory variables for bank risk. In contrast, the 
contagion variable is significant in explaining Canadian and Australian bank risk, which 
suggests that prudential regulators should look to specifically allocate a portion of 
regulatory capital to deal with contagion effects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Canada and Australia share many similarities but also some differences. Their 
geography involves small populations living mainly in large cities, with large parts 
of each continent relatively uninhabited and possessing substantial mineral wealth. 
The Queen of Australia and the Queen of Canada is the same person, which 
reflects their shared British heritage. Differences are found in their locations: one 
in the northern hemisphere close to the USA and the other far away in the 
southern hemisphere close to Asia. 
 
The popular press contains many references to how the two countries are similar 
(e.g. Sales, 2003). Academic research has also identified similarities as well as 
differences in a number of different contexts (e.g. Brooks, 2009; Allen & Powell, 
2010; Allen, Boffey, & Powell, 2011).  MacMillan & McKenzie (2002) provide a 
detailed analysis of how the various relations between Canada and Australia have 
changed during the twentieth century. They conclude that similarities between the 
two countries have underpinned the cooperation and cordiality that is a feature of 
the relationship. 
  
With the occurrence of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a new area of similarity 
between the two countries has emerged: “the relative resilience of our banking 
sectors” (Stevens, 2009). In this speech, RBA Governor Stevens highlights how 
Canadian and Australian banks lent more conservatively and held only modest 
amounts of the complex securities which have plagued banks in other countries, 
allowing them to emerge from the GFC “… largely free of serious problems” 
(Stevens, 2009). Other authors have reached similar conclusions. Dickinson 
(2010a, 2010b) identifies a number of factors, including the past conservatism of 
Canadian and Australian regulatory requirements regarding capital adequacy; the 
lack of compromised lending standards; and a focus on domestic lending. 
Ratnovski and Huang (2009) undertake similar analysis, but only focus on 
Canadian banks and their balance sheets. The benefit of strong bank regulation in 
Canada and Australia is a sentiment also echoed by Smith (2010). Dickinson 
notes that both the European Union and the G-20 are looking to modify their 
banking regulations in the light of the Canadian and Australian experience. 
 
Despite this promotion of Canada and Australia as exemplars of bank regulation in 
the time of a GFC, however, both countries experienced a sharp increase in 
impaired assets  (as shown in section 2), fivefold for Australia and more than 
double for Canada. The current research aims to investigate what factors 
determined this increase in impaired assets, and more specifically whether bank 
risk in these countries is most influenced by bank specific variables or contagion 
arising from key global markets. Potentially, this is important research because it 
may identify peculiarities of Australian and Canadian banks as well as determine 
the role of contagion in influencing bank risk. This study has two novel aspects. 
Firstly, it includes Distance to Default (DD as measured by the Merton, 1974 
structural model) of Australian and Canadian Banks an explanatory variable of 
bank risk. Secondly, it investigates the impact of global default risk on Australian 
and Canadian banks by using DD of US and European Banks as a measure of 
contagion. The study finds that contagion is a far more significant determinant of 
Australian and Canadian bank risk than bank specific variables.     
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The next section of the paper provides background information on the banking 
industry in Australia and Canada, together with a literature survey on determinants 
of bank risk. Section 3 deals with data and methodology. Section 4 covers the 
findings and discussion, with conclusions and implications provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. The Banking Industry in Australia and Canada 
 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) regulates all Authorised 
Deposit-taking Institutions (ADI’s) in Australia.  As per statistics from APRA (2009) 
and the RBA (2009a), ADI’s comprise  58 banks, 11 building societies, and 129 
credit unions.  Of the 58 banks, 13 are Australian-owned comprising 88 % of total 
bank assets. The remainder are subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks, 
comprising 12 % of total bank assets. The four major banks (Westpac, ANZ, 
National Australia Bank, and Commonwealth Bank) comprise approximately 75 % 
of all ADI assets. 
  
The Canadian Bank regulator is the Office of the Canadian Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (OSFI). Figures provided by the OSFI (2009) show Canada 
has a total of 78 banks with assets totalling USD $3 trillion. Twenty two of these 
are domestic banks, with the others being primarily branches of foreign banks. Of 
the 22 domestic banks, 9 are public companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange. The ‘Big 5’ banks (Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, 
Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, and Canadian Imperial Bank) have total 
assets of USD $2.4 trillion, which is approximately 80% of the total Canadian 
domestic banking market. 
  
It is important to examine impaired assets; given this is our dependent variable. 
Table 1 shows growth in total and impaired assets. Australian and Canadian 
banks continue to grow total assets over the GFC period. Total assets in 
Australian banks doubled over the 5 years to 2009, a slightly higher growth rate 
than for Canada. Impaired assets for Australia showed a fivefold increase from 
2007 - 2009. However, because this is off a low base of 0.19%, the peak of 0.95% 
is very low in comparison to international standards. Canadian banks more than 
doubled their increase in impaired assets from 0.4% to 0.9%, but off a higher 
base. In comparison to Australia and Canada, the US (Federal Reserve Bank, 
2009) and UK (Bank of England, 2009) showed delinquency rates more than 
trebling from 2007 to 2009 from 2.4% to 8.8% and from 2.1% to 6.6% respectively.  
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Table 1. Key Growth and Risk Indicators for Australian Banks 
 
Figures are calculated from RBA Statistics (2009b) for Australian banks and OSFI (2009) for 
Canadian banks. For comparison purposes, all amounts are in USD. 
 
 
DD is a key explanatory variable in our study. As equity (capital) ratios are a key 
component to measuring this DD, as discussed in our methodology section, we 
present a summary of the capital ratios for Australian and Canadian banks in 
2008, the height of the GFC. Tier 1 and total capital ratios for both countries in 
Table 2 are well above the regulatory requirements of 4% and 8% respectively. 
Total equity ratio (shareholders funds to total assets) is substantially lower than 
the total capital ratio for both countries, in line with their high housing loan 
component which attracts a lower risk weighting than commercial borrowers. The 
equity ratios for Australian and Canadian banks is substantially higher than the 
ratio of 3.5% we have calculated for European banks, but somewhat lower than 
the 7.1% for the US. 
 
Table 2. Capital and Equity Ratios 2008 
 Tier 1 Capital (%) Total Capital (%) Equity Ratio (%) 
Australia 8.4 11.4 6.2 
Canada 11.8 14.5 5.2 
Figures for both countries are taken at quarterly reporting date March 2009, or closest reporting 
date to it. Tier 1 and Total Capital figures are as reported by the banks in accordance with Basel 
requirements.   
 
 
Overall, this section shows substantial increases in Australian and Canadian bank 
impaired assets, albeit at modest levels compared to other major global areas. 
 
 
Total 
assets 
($bn)
Impaired 
assets (%)
Total 
assets 
($bn)
Impaired 
assets (%)
Mar-2000 989           0.6 1,431        1.1
Mar-2001 1,176        0.6 1,577        1.4
Mar-2002 1,153        0.7 1,651        1.6
Mar-2003 1,216        0.6 1,703        1.6
Mar-2004 1,396        0.4 1,754        1.1
Mar-2005 1,536        0.3 1,877        0.6
Mar-2006 1,764        0.2 2,083        0.5
Mar-2007 2,016        0.2 2,375        0.4
Mar-2008 2,463        0.3 2,727        0.5
Mar-2009 2,694        1.0 3,021        0.9
Australia Canada
4 
 
2.2. Determinants of Bank Risk 
 
Prior studies, in various countries, are mixed in their findings as to determinants of 
bank risk (such as share price volatility and default), with independent variables 
including a variety of balance sheet and profitability items such as size, profitability 
and equity. Several studies have considered diversification of bank income 
sources (such as interest versus non-interest income and loans versus non-loan 
assets) as a determinant of bank risk (for example, Acharya, Hasan, & Saunders, 
2006; Allen & Powell, 2010; Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian, 2002; De Young & Roland, 
2001; Saunders & Walter, 1994; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh & Rumble, 
2006). Other studies find that balance sheet and income statement items or ratios 
provide little explanation of bank risk, and that changes in volatility and default are 
often caused by external shocks or contagion. Several studies have considered 
the contagion aspect using contagion measures such as correlation of corporate 
defaults, credit default swaps, macroeconomic factors and Value at Risk (for 
example, Allen, Powell, Kramadibrata & Singh, 2011; Das, Duffie, Kapadia, & 
Saiata, 2007; Davis & Lo, 2001; Giesecke & Weber, 2004, 2006; Jorion & Zhang, 
2007; Liao & Chang, 2010; Lonstaff & Rajan, 2008; Rosch & Winterfeldt, 2008). 
There are also some notable studies which look at determinants of bank capital 
(Gropp & Heider, 2009; Kuo, 2003; Ngo, 2008; Rime, 2001) which have some 
common independent variables to those used by the abovementioned studies of 
determinants of bank volatility and default. 
 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
 
We include all 13 Australian listed banks and 9 listed Canadian banks. For 
Australia this includes the 4 major banks and 9 smaller / regional banks (88% of 
total bank assets in Australia). In Canada this includes the ‘Big 5’ and 4 smaller 
banks (over 80% of total bank assets in Canada). All data is obtained from 
Datastream, including 10 years of daily equity prices for each bank, together with 
required balance sheet data for calculating DD as described below.  
 
3.2. DD Methodology 
 
We measure distance to default (DD) using the Merton (1974) structural 
methodology. The firm defaults when asset values fall below debt levels. Moody’s 
KMV model (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) is based on the Merton model, and is widely 
used by banks to measure DD. Based on the thousands of defaulted firms in their 
worldwide database, KMV find that DD is most accurately measured when debt is 
taken as short-term liabilities (one year and under) plus half the book value of all 
long term debt outstanding. This is the approach used in this study. Using equity 
returns and the relationship between equity and assets, we estimate an initial 
asset return. Daily log return is calculated and new asset values estimated for 
every day. Following KMV, this is repeated until asset returns converge. The 
standard deviation of these asset returns (σv) is used in the calculation of DD as 
follows: 
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Where V is the market value of the firm, F = face value of firm’s debt, and µ = an 
estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets. T is usually set as 1 year. 
 
3.3. Multiple Regression 
 
Impaired assets (also known as non-performing loans) is the dependent variable 
(NPL), with separate fixed effects regressions for Australia and Canada. This is 
confirmed via the Hausman test to be the most appropriate option with panel data 
for each bank for each of the 10 years in our dataset (1999 -2008). Drawing on 
key prior studies identified in Section 2, as well as including DD and Contagion 
(explained after the equation), we use the following variables: 
 
NPLit =  β1Sizeit  + β2Equityit + β3ROEit + β4LAit + β5CLLit + β6INTIit 
           + β7DDit+ β8Contagionit + αi + εit     (2) 
 
NPL is the percentage of non-performing loans (or impaired assets as described in 
Table 1). Size is the natural logarithm of total balance sheet assets. Equity is total 
balance sheet equity / total balance sheet assets. ROE is net profit before tax / 
total balance sheet equity. LA, CLL and INTI are measures of diversification. LA is 
total balance sheet loans / total balance sheet assets. CLL is commercial loans (as 
opposed to residential) / total loans. INTI is gross interest income / total income. 
DD is the distance to default for each Canadian or Australian bank. Contagion is 
global DD which is the combined DD of Europe and US which we calculate for 
listed banks in these regions in the same way as we calculate it for Australia and 
Canada per Section 3.2. Note that we also examined ROA as an alternative to 
ROE, and Tier 1 Capital ratio as an alternative to Equity ratio. We selected ROE 
and Equity as they provided a slightly better fit in term of R2 than the alternate 
measures, and to avoid multicollinearity we excluded the alternate measures. A 
variety of lags were applied to each of the variables, but no lagging of variables 
significantly improved any of the outcomes and so lags are not reported here. 
 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
Results are shown in Table 3. R2 is shown at 2 levels; excluding and including 
Contagion. The model excluding Contagion does not provide a good explanation 
for NPL with R2 of only 0.306 for Australia (DD being the only significant item) and 
0.493 for Canada (DD being the most significant item, with lesser significance 
shown for Size and Equity). R2 increases substantially, especially for Australia, 
when including Contagion. Findings are generally consistent with the studies 
mentioned in Section 2.2., which found that balance sheet and income statement 
factors are not a good indicator of bank risk and that external shocks caused by 
global contagion (as measured by global DD in our study) can have a significant 
impact. We note that bank specific variables have slightly more explanatory power 
for Canada as compared to Australia (and Contagion slightly less) which we 
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attribute to the higher country specific NPL experienced by Canada in the earlier 
years of our data sample. 
 
Table 3. Risk Determinants 
 
The table shows regression results with NPL as the dependent variable. The regression includes 
panel data for the ten years 1999 – 2008 with bank and time fixed effects.  Independent variables 
are shown in the first column, as defined in Section 3.3. */**/*** denote significance at the 90/95/99 
percent levels respectively.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
 
Although both Australian and Canadian banks fared substantially better than their 
global counterparts during the GFC, both regions nonetheless experienced a 
significant increase in risk as measured by impaired assets. For both countries, 
collective balance sheet and income statement characteristics were not found to 
be a good predictor of bank risk, but global contagion was found to be highly 
significant. The low balance sheet significance and high contagion aspect makes it 
important for regulators and banks in smaller countries such as Australia and 
Canada to factor in potential external shocks as a key component of risk 
measurement and management.   
 
  
Coefficient      t Coefficient      t
Size -0.091 -1.282 -0.256 -1.752 *
Equity -0.083 -0.258 -19.220 -2.351 **
ROE -0.028 -0.148 -0.199 -1.307
LA -0.580 -1.373 0.199 0.211
CLL 0.383 1.251 -0.788 -0.621
INTI 0.008 0.952 0.199 0.239
DD -0.025 -6.382 *** -0.066 -3.968 ***
Constant 2.015 1.988 ** 14.215 4.830 ***
R2 - excluding contagion 0.306 0.493
R2 - including contagion 0.815 0.720
          Australia        Canada
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